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is written in her personal capacity.
et the child be excused by his age, the woman by her sex,’ says Seneca 
in the treatise in which he vents his anger upon anger.” So wrote 
Hugo Grotius in his 1625 masterwork titled The Law of War and 
Peace. With that quotation, Grotius traced to the writings of an ancient 
Roman philosopher the injunction against harming women and children 
in time of war. 
Grotius’ reiteration of Seneca’s words tacitly admitted that as late as 
1625, armies still were violating the injunction. Sadly, the same is true 390 
years later. Today, neither women nor children are excused from wartime 
assaults, violence and upheaval. 
In Syria alone, four years of conﬂict have left well over 220,000 persons 
dead, and many more in dire need. Women and children are included 
in those statistics; indeed, of the 12.5 million Syrians now requiring 
humanitarian assistance, 5.6 million are children. 




Author’s Note: This essay is based on the text of the talk I gave as the Distinguished Discussant for the 
16th Annual Grotius Lecture delivered on April 9, 2014, in Washington, D.C., at the joint meeting of the 
American Society of International Law and the International Law Association. Delivering the principal 
lecture was Radhika Coomaraswamy, then a Global Professor of Law at the New York University School 
of Law and formerly the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general on children & armed conﬂict 
and the U.N. special rapporteur on violence against women. Her lecture and my response are reprinted 
in volume 30 of the American University International Law Review (2015), pp. 1–52, and also will 
appear in a forthcoming volume of ASIL Proceedings. 
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Legal discussions of such crises frequently turn on the 
discourse of human rights, according to which every person 
enjoys upon birth certain fundamental rights, and the violation 
of those rights demands a remedy. The discourse is deservedly a 
cornerstone of post-World War II legal thinking. 
But the current human rights regime incurs criticism, as 
Radhika Coomaraswamy pointed out in the talk that gave rise 
to this essay. I will examine some reasons for that criticism 
with the aim of imagining a possible future – that of the post-
postcolonial child.
Coomaraswamy, a Sri Lankan lawyer who has served as a 
U.N. under-secretary-general, referred in particular to certain 
postcolonial scholars from the global south. These scholars, 
she said, “reject the human rights framework as part of the 
‘liberal’ ‘imperialist’ project especially when it comes to 
cultural practices,” and they further “reject the dominance of 
the European Enlightenment and the sacredness of the power 
of reason.” 
My own response to such rejections might raise hackles 
among some of those scholars, for it begins with 
this claim: We are all postcolonials now.
By way of example, both of my own countries 
of citizenship are postcolonial states. 
One is Ireland. This is the eighth decade 
since the adoption of the Irish Constitution, 
a postcolonial charter from which India later 
borrowed. Yet as demonstrated by the ﬁrst-ever 
visit to England by an Irish President – in 2014 – remnants of 
eight centuries of colonization still litter both islands. 
My other country is, of course, the United States. Here, 
the structure of government rests upon the postcolonial 
intuitions of the men who wrote its Constitution. Having 
won a revolution, these framers professed to borrow the best 
and to reject the worst from their colonial past. The choices 
they made two hundred years ago – admirable choices like the 
checking of power and shameful ones like slavery – inﬂuence 
U.S. policy to this day. 
To this day, moreover, Americans see themselves as having 
repulsed foreign tyranny and invented a superior form of 
sovereignty. The American identity thus remains postcolonial 
– also, perhaps, preimperial. This self-perception contributes 
to seemingly contradictory impulses that have coexisted for 
much of American history; to be speciﬁc, the U.S. afﬁnity for 
intervention overseas and the U.S. aversion to scrutiny from 
abroad.
Such interrelations of subjugation and independence, of 
isolation and cooperation, of the internal and the international, 
pervade our world. Relationships of this sort may be found 
to some degree in and among all member states of the United 
Nations. They pertain as well to nonmember entities, such as 
Taiwan, Kosovo and Palestine. 
It is in our efforts to restitch the remnants of colonization – 
and maybe, in places like Crimea, to confront a new colonial 
patchwork – that we, the members of the global community, 
are revealed as postcolonials.
This is especially the case with regard to international law. 
International law is said to have forefathers: a few Spanish 
priests and the luminary quoted at the outset of this essay, 
Grotius. The periods of colonization in which these men lived 
shaped their writings; in turn, their writings shaped, even 
justiﬁed, the colonial project. 
Grotius was, among many other things, a lawyer for the 
Dutch East India Company. His position in the colonial era is 
evident in his espousal of jus praedae, the law of prize. It also 
surfaces in his acceptance of slavery as a fact of the 
law of nations – albeit a fact “contrary to nature,” a 
practice that better nations would do well to avoid.
Our own international legal system operates in 
reaction to that colonial era. In the last half-century the 
norm of sovereign equality empowered new states as 
they emerged out of eroded empires. This dispersion of 
authority is apparent in one member-one vote bodies 
like the U.N. General Assembly. 
Yet signiﬁcant power still resides exclusively in certain states; 
most notably, the U.N. Security Council’s ﬁve permanent 
members. Each of those so-called P-5 members has, at various 
times, shown an imperialist streak. Vestiges of colonialism 
remain hallmarks of our postcolonial epoch.
We are thus in need of post-postcolonialism. To paraphrase 
Can the Subaltern Speak?, an oft-quoted 1988 writing by 
Columbia Literature Professor Gayatri Spivak: Not only must 
the subaltern be permitted to speak, but when she does, others 
must listen, must admit her as an equal to their ongoing 
conversation, and must, eventually, adjust their behavior to 
accommodate her place in their world. 
Tulane Law Professor Adeno Addis aptly has labeled this 
process “dialogic pluralism.”1 
Legal discussions 
... frequently turn 
on the discourse of 
human rights ...
1  Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic 
Minorities, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 615 (1992).
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2  Mireille Delmas-Marty, Global Law: A Triple Challenge (Naomi Norberg trans. 2003).
3  Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (2012); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Situating Women in Counterterrorism 
Discourses: Undulating Masculinities and Luminal Femininities, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1085 (2013); Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement 
with International Law through the UN Security Council, Australian Feminist L.J. 97 (2010).
Efforts toward this end may be found in the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. Each of these treaties enjoys wide membership 
among the countries of the world (the United States, however, 
belongs to neither). Each includes provisions aimed at 
increasing participation by, and breaking down stereotypes 
about, women or children. 
Nevertheless, the inﬂuence even of adult women remains 
circumscribed. As theorists like Collège de France Professor 
Mireille Delmas-Marty have stressed, moreover, the process 
of pluralistic dialogue must alter the structures of social and 
economic inequality within which the seeds of armed violence 
germinate.2
What did Grotius, our putative forefather of international 
law, have to say about women and children? His historical 
account afforded little relief for either. “[I]ncluded in the law of 
war,” he stated, was a “right to inﬂict injury” that extended to 
“the slaughter even of infants and of women ... with impunity.” 
Yet his very mention of women and children hinted at 
a preferred rule, one that he soon made explicit. “Children 
should always be spared,” Grotius wrote, and so too most 
women. Among his most plaintive examples in support of this 
injunction is this quotation of another ancient Roman, Lucan: 
“‘For what crime could little ones have deserved death?’” 
Grotius typically portrayed women, no less than children, 
as “innocents” who should be exempted from the ravages of 
war. Notably, he included within this exemption a ban on 
sexual assault. Grotius acknowledged that “many” writers 
had maintained “that the raping of women in time of war is 
permissible.” He disagreed:
A better conclusion has been reached by others, 
who have taken into consideration not only the 
injury but the unrestrained lust of the act; also, 
the fact that such acts do not contribute to safety 
or to punishment, and should consequently not go 
unpunished in war any more than in peace.
That conclusion was “the law not of all nations, but of 
the better ones,” Grotius wrote. He then insisted that among 
“Christians” this view “shall be enforced, not only as a part 
of military discipline, but also as a part of the law of nations; 
that is, whoever forcibly violates chastity, even in war, should 
everywhere be subject to punishment.”
The quoted passages depict women and children as 
bystanders, beings not fully conscious of the world around them 
– not actors, but rather objects, in the tableau of the battleﬁeld. 
They are to be protected, rescued even, in service of the actors’ 
notions of honor. A social scientist would say they have no 
agency. They are, ﬁrst and last, victims.
The depiction rings familiar almost four centuries later. Law 
professors like Mark Drumbl of Washington and Lee University, 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin of the universities of Minnesota and of 
Ulster, and Dianne Otto of the University of Melbourne are 
just a few of the many scholars demonstrating that the discourse 
of victimhood continues both to motivate and to justify global 
action on behalf of persons perceived as victims.3 
Here too, then, remnants of a colonialist power dynamic 
persist in what is supposed to be a postcolonial era.
What is to be done? Makers of post-postcolonial international 
law should aspire to deploy the tools of motivation and action in 
a way that avoids reviving outdated notions of societal honor, and 
instead honors the actual humans who endure violence amid war. 
“Menwomenandchildren” is not a single word; discrete 
attention must be paid to the many different hues of human 
experience. Victimization may be an aspect of that experience, 
but it is not the only one. 
Consider this sentence from the story of someone 
who survived World War II: “Children, even relatively 
young children, learn to be cunning or street-smart when 
“Menwomenandchildren” is not a single word; discrete attention must 
be paid to the many different hues of human experience. Victimization 
may be an aspect of that experience, but it is not the only one.
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circumstances demand, and they are fast learners when they 
have to be in order to live another day.” The author of this 
passage, occurring in a 2009 book titled A Lucky Child: A 
Memoir of Surviving Auschwitz as a Young Boy, is George 
Washington University Law Professor Thomas Buergenthal, 
whose career has included service as a judge on the 
International Court of Justice.
Another backward glance reveals glimpses of Buergenthal’s 
insight in Grotius’ time, and not only because Grotius himself 
began the practice of law at the ripe old age of 17. Was there, 
in that time, any foremother of international law? 
In his introduction to a 1925 reissue of Grotius’ work, an 
early president of the American Society of International Law, 
James Brown Scott, praised “that noble woman who preserved 
him” – that is, Grotius – “for us and for international law.” 
That woman was Grotius’ wife, Maria de Groot. 
When Dutch authorities detained the couple as political 
dissidents, she and a maidservant stuffed Grotius in a trunk 
and smuggled him to France. There he completed The Law of 
War and Peace. As long ago as the 17th century, Maria and her 
maid ﬂouted the stereotype of passive womanhood.
The same is surely true of two other women of that era. 
One is the Spanish queen who commissioned the voyage of 
Columbus; the other, the queen who waged war in England’s 
ﬁrst colony and built a global navy whose power encroached 
upon the Grotian tenet of mare liberum, freedom of the seas. 
These two monarchs contributed mightily to colonialism, the 
practice that Grotius and the Spanish priests theorized. 
If Grotius is a forefather, therefore, Isabella and Elizabeth are 
foremothers of international law. Perhaps it is in recognition of 
their ruthless reigns that Grotius stopped short of advocating a 
blanket exemption for women. To the contrary, he maintained 
that wartime violence could be wreaked against women who 
“have committed a crime which ought to be punished in a 
special manner” – women who “take the place of men.”
This and other Grotian references to punishment direct me 
to a ﬁnal consideration, accountability. 
On this, Coomaraswamy’s talk was rather more sanguine than 
am I. She cited with optimism developments aimed at improving 
the lot of women and of children – initiatives by nation-states and 
by the United Nations, as well as Security Council resolutions and 
International Criminal Court prosecutions. 
A pessimist, however, would be pained to point out that the 
Security Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed 
Conﬂict seldom has acted on a years-old proposal to sanction 
persistent perpetrators of grave violations like recruiting or using 
child soldiers. 
And although the ICC broke ground by convicting a militia 
leader of those very war crimes, it also must be noted that two 
subsequent verdicts acquitted other leaders of similar charges, 
despite judges’ ﬁndings that child soldiers were everywhere 
during the conﬂict under review. What is more, not one ICC 
verdict yet has resulted in conviction on charges of sexual 
violence. 
Considered in light of developments at the Security Council, 
legal technicalities that explain the ICC verdicts ought to be 
put to one side in order to examine the possibility that the 
international community may have entered a new era of soft 
(some would say no) accountability.
So where does this leave us? If not victim, who is our post-
postcolonial child or woman, and how should international law 
both protect and empower her? 
Initially, we must accept that she may not be a she. This is an 
insight gaining currency in the last couple years, as global actors 
start to address sexual violence and other wartime harms done to 
boys and, yes, even to adult men. 
Furthermore, there is much to be gleaned from the recent 
scholarship of Emory Law Professor Martha Albertson 
Fineman.4 That scholarship posits that what warrants protection 
is not sex, not age, but vulnerability. It thus refocuses analysis 
away from a singular identity as “man” or “woman” or “child” 
and toward the varied ways that all persons, on account of 
some traits but not others, at some periods in their lives but not 
others, may be vulnerable. 
It is to those moments of vulnerability that Fineman 
would direct the making and implementation of law. Her 
focus brings into view an image that transcends both colonial 
and postcolonial assumptions of societal strata and personal 
predilections. It thus bears promise for the envisaging of a post-
postcolonial future.
Who knows? Maybe a global culture cognizant that everyone 
at times is weak will prove less eager to initiate armed violence, 
less apt to tolerate the violence done by structural inequalities 
and more willing to construct a just and enduring peace.
So where does this leave us? If 
not victim, who is our post-
postcolonial child or woman, 
and how should international law 
both protect and empower her? 
4   E.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive 
State, 60 Emory L.J. 251 (2010–2011).
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